ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
In today's digital world, there is a great wealth of information, which can be accessed in various forms: text, images, audio, and video. It is easy to ensure the security of "analog documents" and protect the author (author will be used to also denote composer, artist, designer, etc.) from having his work stolen or copied. For example, a painting is signed by the artist, books and albums have copyright labels imprinted inside the cover. The question is how do you copyright or label digital information and preserve its security without destroying or modifying the content of the information.
One approach to data security is to use cryptographic techniques. In cryptology, the information is scrambled using an encryption transformation before it is sent and the information can be viewed after de-scrambling with the inverse transformation. A public-key cryptosystem can be used to implement an electronic mail system in which messages are kept private and can be signed [l] . The security of the encryption algorithm is based on the fact that no one has discovered an algorithm which can factor composite numbers with two very large prime factors (on the order of 200 digits) in a reasonable amount of time. Note that cryptosystems restrict access to the document and do not label or stamp them. Once the documents are decrypted, the "signature" is removed and there is no proof of ownership such as a label, stamp, or watermark [2] . , may be used for digital TV broadcasting to pro'vide conditional access for pay TV, watermarking of images for copyright protection, and image signature for authentication. Note, that it is useful to consider the binary representation of these 1.arge numbers and their prime factors as codewords for the signatures.
Data hiding, or steganography, refers to techniques for embeddin.g watermarks, signatures, tamper protection, and captions in digital data. Captioning is an application which requires a large amount of d.ata. However, it need not be invariant t o removal because it contains extra non-critical information which may be of benefit to the author and the user. On the other hand, watermarking is an application which embeds the least amount of data, but requires the greatest robustness because the watermark is required for copyright protection [4] . Note that data hiding does not restrict access to the original information as does encryption.
A watermark, or an invisible stamp, could be used to provide proof of "authorship" of a signal. Similarly, a signature is used to provide proof of ownership and track illegal copies of the signal. The watermark must be embedded in the data such that it is imperceptible by the user [3, 4, 51. Moreover, the watermark should:
be inaudible: the watermark should not affect the audio quality of the original signal; be statistically invisible a "pirate" should not be able to detect the watermark by comparing several signals belonging to the saime author to prevent unauthorized detection and/or Iemoval; have similar compression characteristics as the original signal to survive compression/decompression operations ; must be robust to $deliberate attacks by "pirates"; must be robust to standard signal manipulation and processing operations on the host data, e.g., filtering, resampling, compression, noise, cropping, A/D-D/A conversions, etc;
should be embedded directly in the data, not in a header to prevent removal; 0 mulst support multiple watermarkings for wider 0 should be self-clocking for ease of detection in the presence of cropping and time-scale change operations.
, applicability;
Observe that a "pirate" can defeat a watermarking scheme in two ways. He may manipulate the audio signal to make the watermark undetectable. Alternatively, he may establish that the watermarking scheme is unreliable, e.g., that it produces too many false alarms by detecting a watermarks where none is present. Both goals can be achieved by adding inaudible jamming signals to the audio piece. Therefore, the effectiveness of a watermarking scheme must be measured by its ability to detect a watermark when one is present (probability of detection) and the probability that it detects a watermark when none is present (probability of a false alarm) in the presence of jamming signals and signal manipulations.
Several techniques for data hiding in images have been developed. Two methods for watermarking images are proposed in [6] . The first approach embeds a PN-sequence on the least significant bit (LSB) of the data. This provides easy and rapid decoding of the watermark or signature. In the second approach, a PN-sequence (watermark) is added to the LSB of the data. This is more difficult to decode, providing more security. As with any approach which modifies the LSB of the data, however, these watermarks are highly sensitive to noise and are easily corrupted.
In other coding schemes, the watermarks are made to appear as quantization noise as they are embedded into the images [7, 81. The first method uses a predictive coding scheme to embed the watermark into the image. In the second method, the watermark is embedded into the image by dithering the image based on the statistical properties of the image. This scheme is not robust to attacks such as requantization and cropping.
In [9] , a watermark for an image is generated by modifying the luminance values inside 8x8 blocks of pixels, adding one extra bit of information to each block. The choice of the modified block is secretly made by the encoder. In [lo] , a 2-D signature is generated and is embedded into the image by modifying the intensity levels of the image, whose corresponding signature pixels is one. A method using a JPEG model based, frequency hopped, randomly sequenced pulse position modulated code in [Ill is robust to operations such as lossy data compression, lowpass filtering, and color space conversion. The watermarking problem is viewed as a problem in digital communications in [12] : a codeword is generated and used to modulate selected coefficients of the DCT or wavelet transform of a block in an image.
Data may be hidden in images by exploiting the properties of the human visual system (HVS), such as sensitivity to contrast as a function of spatial frequency, the masking effect of edges, and sensitivity to changes in gray-scale [4] . In [4, 131, techniques for data hiding in images are discussed. The first, an LSB method called "Patchwork," is a statistical technique which randomly chooses n pairs ( a t , b,) of points in an image and increases the brightness of at by one unit while simultaneously decreasing the brightness of b,. The second, texture block coding, hides data by mapping a random texture pattern in an image to another region in the image with a similar texture pattern. This method is limited to images that possess large areas of random texture. In [13] , an encoding scheme is made resistant to affine transformations (scaling, translations, rotations) by embedding crosses in an image. Xerox DataGlyph technology [4, 141 adds a barcode to its images according to a predetermined set of geometric modifications. In [15] data is hidden in the chrominance signal of NTSC by exploiting the HVS temporal over-sampling of color. Adelson [16] proposes a scheme that embeds digital data into analog TV signals. The method substitutes high-spatial frequency image data for "hidden" data in a pyramid-encoded image. However, the scheme is particularly susceptible to filtering and rescaling.
A method similar to ours is proposed in [5] , where the N largest frequency components of an image are modified by Gaussian noise. However, the scheme only modifies a subset of the frequency components and does not take into account the HVS. The audio watermark we propose here embeds the masimum amount of information throughout the spectrum while still remaining perceptually inaudible. It is well-known that detection performance (i.e., the probability of detection and the probability of false alarm) improves with the energy of the signal to be detected. Therefore, we effectively improve the performance of the watermarking scheme by increasing the energy of the watermarked signal while keeping it inaudible.
Data hiding techniques have also been applied to audio signals [4, 131. In Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum Coding (DSSS), the signature, a binary codeword, is modulated by both a PN-sequence and the audio signal using bi-phase shift keying. It is then added to the original signal as additive random noise. The perceivable noise added to the signal can be reduced by adaptive coding and redundant coding. In Phase Coding, binary information is embedded in the audio signal by modifying the phases of each frequency component of the Discrete Short Time Fourier Transform of the signal. Because the human auditory system (HAS) is not highly sensitive to phase distortion, the data produce no audible distortion.
In this paper, we present a novel technique for embedding digital watermarks into audio signals. The watermark is generated by filtering a PN-sequence with a filter that approximates the frequency masking characteristics of the HAS. It is then weighted in the time domain to account for temporal masking. Note that our approach is similar to that of [4, 131 in that we shape the frequency characteristics of a PN-sequence. However, unlike [4, 131 we use perceptual masking models of the HAS to generate the watermark. In particular, our scheme for audio is the only one that uses the frequency masking models of the HAS along with the temporal masking models to hide the copyright information in the signal.
We also provide a study of the detection performance of our watermarking scheme. Our results indicate that our scheme is robust to lossy coding/decoding, D/A -A/D conversion, signal resampling, and filtering. We are currently studying its robustness to time-frequency changes.
Finally, observe that the approach described here for watermarking audio signals can also be used to watermark image and video data with appropriate modifications and extensions (c.f.
[17], [18]).
BACKGROUND

Masking
Masking is the effect by which a faint but audible sound becomes inaudible in the presence of another louder audible sound, masker [19] . The masking effect depends on the both spectral and temporal characteristics of both the masked signal and the masker [19] . Frequency masking refers to masking which occurs in the frequency domain. If two signals which occur simultaneously are close together in frequency, the stronger masking signal will make the weaker masked signal inaudible. The masking threshold of a masker depends on the frequency, sound pressure level (SPL), and tone-like or noise-like characteristics of both the masker and the masked signal [20] . It is easier for a broadband noise to mask a tonal, than for a tonal signal to mask out a broadband noise. Moreover, higher frequency signals are more easily masked. Temporal masking refers to both pre-and post-masking. Pre-masking effects render weaker signals inaudible before the stronger masker is turned on, and post-masking effects render weaker signals inaudible after the stronger masker is turned off. Pre-masking occurs from 5-20 msec. before the masker is turned on while post-masking occurs from 50-200 msec. after the masker is turned off [20] .
Using the frequency masking information of the HAS, we can shape the spectral characteristics of the watermark. Processing of impulsive signals such as castanets can cause audible pre-echoes. Similarly, we can use temporal masking information to eliminate these effects.
Frequency Masking: MPEG-1 Psychoacoustic
Audio signals consist of telephone quality speech, wideband speech, and wideband audio. The frequency ranges for these types of audio signals are 300-3400 Hz for telephone speech signals, 50-7000 Hz for wideband speech, and 20-20000 Hz for high quality wideband audio. The human ear acts as a frequency analyzer and can detect sounds with frequencies which vary from 10 Hz to 20000 Hz. The HAS can be modeled by a set of 26 bandpass filters with bandwidths that increase with increasing frequency. The 26 bands are known as the critical bands. The critical bands are defined around a center frequency in which the noise bandwidth is increased until there is just noticeable difference in the tone at the center frequency. Thus if a faint tone lies in the critical band of a louder tone, the faint tone will not be perceptible.
Frequency masking models have already been defined for the perceptual coding of audio signals because it is not necessary to code perceptually irrelevant information. In this work, we use the masking model defined in MPEG Au- 
The power spectrum of the signal s(n) is calculated as follows:
The maximum is normalized to a reference sound pressure level of 96dB.
e Second
Step: Identafy Tonal Components
Tonal (sinusoidal) and non tonal (noisy) components are identified because their masking models are different. A ton,al component is a local maximum of the spectrum
We add to its intensity those of the previous and following component. Other tonal components in the same frequency band are no longer considered. Non-tonal components arie made of the sum of the intensities of the signal components remaining in each of the 24 critical bands between 0 and 15500 Ha. (The auditory system behaves as a bank of bandpass filters, with continuously overlapping center frequencies These "auditory filters" ctan be approximated by rectangular filters with critical bandwidth increasing with frequency. In this model, the audible band is therefore divided into 24 non-regular critical bands )
Those components below the absolute hearing threshold and tonal components separated by less than 0.5 Barks. In this step, we account for the frequency masking effects of the HAS. We need to discretize the frequency axis according to hearing sensitivity and express frequencies in Barks. Note that hearing sensitivity is higher at low frequencies. The resulting masking curves are almost linear and depend on a masking index different for tonal and non-tonal components. They axe characterized by different lower and upper slopes depending on the distance between the masked and the masking component. We use fi to denote the set of frequencies present in the test signal. The global masking threshold for each frequency f z takes into account the absolute hearing threshold Sa and the masking curves PZ of the Nt tonal components and N, non-tonal components: 
The masking threshold is then the minimum of the local masking threshold and the absolute hearing threshold in each of the 32 equal width subbands of the spectrum. Any signal which falls below the masking threshold is inaudible. 
PN-sequences
PN-sequences form the basis of our watermarking scheme because of their noise-like characteristics, resistance to interference, and good auto-correlation properties. Spread spectrum communication systems use pseudo-noise (PN) sequences to modulate transmitted data into noise-like wideband signals so they blend into the background [23] . Spread spectrum signals are resistant to interference such as unintentional interference, channel noise, multiple users, multipath interference, or intentional jammers [23] .
Fourth step in generation of masking PN-sequences are periodic noise-like binary sequences generated by feedback shift register of fixed length m [23] . The feedback is linear, that is, it consists of only modulo-2 adders. This prevents the zero state from occurring, which provides an output of only zeros. The maximum period of a PN-sequence is N = 2" -1 [as]. The feedback connections for maximal length PN-sequences with m varying from 1 t o 89 are provided in [24] . Maximum length PN-sequences, also called m-sequences, are used in our watermarking scheme because they provide an easy way to generate a unique code for an author's identification. Moreover, like random binary sequences, m-sequences have 0's and 1's occur with equal probabilities. Also, the number of 1's is always one greater than the number of 0's. M-sequences also have good autocorrelation properties [23] : the autocorrelation function (ACF) has period N and it is binary valued. The ACF has peaks equal to 1 at 0, N, 2N, etc. and is approximately 1/N elsewhere. Because of these periodic peaks, the m-sequence is self-clocking. This allows the author to synchronize with the embedded watermark during the detection process. This is important if the signal is cropped and resampled.
WATERMARK DESIGN
Each audio signal is watermarked with a unique codeword. Our watermarking scheme is based on a repeated application of a basic watermarking operations on processed versions of the audio signal. The basic method uses three steps to watermark an audio segment as shown in 4. The complete watermarking scheme is shown in 5. Below we provide a detailed explanation of the basic watermarking step and the complete watermarking technique. 
Figure 6. Filtered PN-sequence
Since the spectral content of the audio signal changes pith time, watermarks added to different blocks will be in ;enera1 different even if they are generated from the same starting PN-sequence. However, we still use different PNjequences for different blocks to make the statistical detec-$ion by an unauthorized user of the watermark more diffi-:ult. Note also that using long PN-sequences or embedding ong cryptographic digital signatures also helps in that re-;pect .
Frequency domain shaping is not enough to guarantee ;hat the watermark will be inaudible. Frequency domain masking computations are based on a Fourier transform tnalysis. A fixed length Fourier transform does not provide side of tha,t subinterval. This then leads to audible distortion, e.g., pre-echoes. To address this problem, we weight the watermark in the time domain with the relative energy of the signal. Specifically, dentote by s ( n ) the nth sample of the audio signal. We modify the watermark, w ( n ) as follows (4) The time domain weighting operation described above attenuates the energy of the clomputed watermark. In particular, watermarks obtained as above have amplitudes that are typically smaller than the quantization step size. Therefore, the watermark would be lost during the quantization proces,s. Note also that, as observed earlier, detection performance is directly proportional to the energy of the watermark. We have found that it is possible to prevent watermark loss during quantization and improve detection performance by amplifying the watermark by 40 dB before weighting it in the time domain with the relative energy of the signal. In most cases, this amplification does not affect the audibiliity of the watermark because of the attenuation effect of the time domain weighting operation. However, to guarantee inaudibility, we re-check that the final watermark falls below the masking threshold in the frequency domain. If the amplitude of the watermark at a given frequency exceeds the masking threshold alt that frequency we simply reduce it to the maximum allowable level.
The full Watermarking scheme
As mentioned above, the watermarking scheme must be robust to codling operations. Lo~w bit rate audio coding algorithms tend retain only the l'ow frequency information in the signal. .We therefore need to guarantee that most of the energy of the watermark lies in low frequencies. After experimenting wi.th many schemes, we have found that the best way to detect the low frequency watermarking information is to generate a low-frequency watermark as the difference between a low bit rate coded/decoded watermarked signal and the coded/decoded original signal at the same bit rate. Watermarki.ng is done using tlne basic watermarking step described above. The low bit rake chosen to implement this operation is the minimal bit rate for which near-transparent audio coding is known to be possible for signals sampled at the rate of the original signal. For signals sampled at 44.1 kHz, the watermark is genlerated using a bit rate of 64 kbits/sec. For signals sampled at 32 kHz, the watermark is generated using a bit rate of 48 kbits/sec. This scheme is more effective than other schemes that attempt to add the Watermark on a lowpass filtered version of the signal because the coding/decoding olperation is not a linear and does not permute with the watermarking operation. Fig. 5 illustrates the above procedure for signals sampled at an arbitrary sampling rate. The low-frequency watermarking signals is shown as w ! ,~ in Fig. 5 . It is given by ;ood time localization for our application. In particular, a vatermark computed using frequency domain masking will (5) ;pread in time over the entire analysis block. If the signal :nergy is concentrated in a time interval that is shorter than Here, the subscript br refers to the bit rate of the ;he analysis block length, the watermark is not masked out-
For best watermark detection performance at higher bit rates, we need to add watermarking information in the higher frequency bands. We do so by producing a watermark werr for the coding error signal that is the difference between the original audio signal and its low bit rate coded version:
The watermark werr is computed using the basic watermarking step described at the beginning of this section.
The final watermark is the sum of the low-frequency watermark and the coding error watermark: 
3.3.
Experimental testing of the audibility of the w a t e r m a r k s We used segments of four different musical pieces as test signals throughout the experiment: the beginning of the third movement of the sonata in B flat major D 960 of Schubert, interpreted by Vladimir Ashkenazy, a castanet piece, a clarinet piece, and a segment of "Tom's Diner" an a capella song by Suzanne Vega (svega). The Schubert signal is sampled at 32 kHz. All other signals are sampled at 44.1 kHz. Note that the castanets signal is one of the signals prone to pre-echoes. The signal svega is significant because it contains noticeable periods of silence. The watermark should not be audible during these silent periods.
The quality of the watermarked signals was evaluated through informal listening tests. In the test, the listener was presented with the original signal and the watermarked signal and reported as to whether any differences could be detected between the two signal. Eight people of varying backgrounds, including the authors, were involved in the listening tests. One of the listeners has the ability to perceive absolute pitch and two of the listeners have some background in music.
In all four test signals, the watermark introduced no audible distortion. No pre-echoes were detected in the watermarked castanet signal. The quiet portions of svega were similarly unaffected.
DETECTION OF THE WATERMARK
Let us now describe the watermark detection scheme and the detection results that we have obtained. In the experimental work described below, we used shaped inaudible noise to simulate attacks by pirates and distortions due to coding. We also tested the effects of filtering, coding, D/A -A/D converting and re-sampling on the detection performance of the proposed scheme. The detection results that we report below are based on processing 100 blocks of the observed signal of 512 samples. Note that this corresponds to 1.6 sec at the 32 kHz sampling rate and 1.16 sec at the 44.1 kHz sampling rate.
Our detection scheme assumes that the author has access to the original signal and the PN-sequence that he used to watermark the signal. It also assumes that the author has computed the approximate bit rate of the observed audio sequence ~( k ) .
To decide whether the given signal ~( k ) has been watermarked or not, the author subtracts from r ( k ) Noise which has the same spectral characteristics as the masking threshold provides an approximation of the worst possible additive distortion to the watermark. This type of distortion is a good worst case model for distortions due to intentional jamming with inaudible signals and mismatches between the actual and assumed coding algorithms.
The noise that we have used in our experiments was generated in the same way as the watermark. Specifically, the masking threshold is first shifted +40dB and multiplied by the discrete Fourier transform of a Gaussian white noise Generation of the Additive Noise process. The resulting noise is then weighted in time by the relative energy of the signal. After quantization, we filter this shaped noise by the masking threshold and requantize it. The resulting noise is almost completely inaudible and is a good approximation of the maximum noise that we can add below the masking threshold, as shown in Fig. 8 . 
--
Summary of Detection Results
Let us now summarize the detection results that we have obtained. Each group of results is meant to illustrate the robustness of our approach to a specific type of signal manipulation.
Robustness to coding
To test the robustness of our watermarking approach to coding, we added noise to several watermarked and nonwatermarked audio pieces and coded the result. The noise was almost inaudible and was generated using the technique described above. We then attempted to detect the presence of the watermark in the decoded signals. The coding/decoding was performed using a software implementation of the ISO/MPEG-1 Audio Layer I11 coder [25] with several different bit rates (64 kbits/s, 128 kbit/s, 160 kbit/s, 224 kbit/s and 320 kbit/s). Table 1 below gives the probabilities of detection and false alarm for the final watermark in the following signals: the Schubert signal, a castanet signal, and a clarinet signal. Note that the probability of detection of the watermark, Pdetect, is 1 or nearly 1 in all cases. Equally important, the probability of false alarm, Pfalsealarm is nearly 0 in all cases.
Robustness to multiple watermarking
There are many instances where it is useful to add multiple watermarks to a signal. For example, there may be multiple authors/composers for a piece of music, each with his/her own unique id. When detecting a specific watermark, the other watermarks are considered to be noise. Tables 2, 3 
Robustness to resampling
Our experiments also indicate that the proposed watermarking scheme is robust to signal resampling. Specifically, the watermarked signal is resampled and then corrupted by the coding/decoding operation. For a threshold of 0.68, Pdetect is 1 and Pfalsealarm is 0 at all 5 coder/decoder bit rates. We are currently assessing the robustness of our scheme to time-scale modifications of the signal.
CONCLUSIONS
Our method for the digital watermarking of audio signals extends the previous work on images. Our watermarking scheme consists of a maximal length PN-sequence filtered by the approximate masking characteristics of the HAS and weighted in time, our watermark is imperceptibly embedded into the audio signal and easy to detect by the author thanks to the correlation properties of PN-sequences. Our results show that our watermarking scheme is robust in the presence of additive noise, lossy coding/decoding, multiple watermarks, resampling, and time-scaling.
Wat a Wat b
Wat c supports de stockage numerique jusqu'a environ 1, 5 kbits/sec Threshold 0.71 0.33 0.55 
